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INTRODUCTION

In every general rate proceeding, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission must establish rates that will generate sufficient revenues to allow the utility to earn a fair and reasonable return upon its investment in
property.' What constitutes a fair and reasonable return cannot be det Member, Minnesota Bar. Mr. Brehl received his B.S. degree from the University
of Notre Dame in 1956 and his LL.B. from the University of Michigan Law School in
1959. He is currently a partner in the St. Paul law firm of Maun, Green, Hayes, Simon,
Johanneson & Brehl and represents Jacobs Wind Electric Company and Northern Public
Service Co., a Division of Donovan Companies, Inc., before the Minnesota Public
Commission.
-f Member, Minnesota bar. Mr. Gallagher received his B.A. degree from the University of Minnesota in 1966 and his J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law School in
1969. He is currently a partner in the St. Paul law firm of Maun, Green, Hayes, Simon,
Johanneson & Brehl and represents Northwestern Bell Telephone Company before the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.
1. See MINN. STAT. §§ 216B. 16(6), 237.075(6) (1982). Chapter 216B vests the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission with the power to regulate, id. § 216B.08, corporations
operating facilities for furnishing at retail natural, manufactured or mixed gas or electric
service to or for the public, id. § 216B.02(4). Subdivision 6 of section 2 16B. 16 provides in
part:
The commission, in the exercise of its powers under this chapter to determine
just and reasonable rates for public utilities, shall give due consideration to the
public need for adequate, efficient, and reasonable service and to the need of the
public utility for revenue sufficient to enable it to meet the cost of furnishing the
service, including adequate provision for depreciation of its utility property used
and useful in rendering service to the public, and to earn a fair and reasonable
return upon the investment in such property.
Id. § 216B.16(6).
Chapter 237 vests the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission with jurisdiction and
supervisory power over telephone companies doing business in Minnesota. Id. § 237.02.
Subdivision 6 of section 237.075 provides in part:
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termined with precision, but it must at least meet the following well2

recognized guidelines:
1. The allowed rate of return should be comparable to those being
made on investments and other business undertakings attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties;
2. The return should be sufficient to enable the utility to maintain its
financial integrity; and
3. The return should be sufficient to attract new capital on reasonable terms.
Additionally, to pass constitutional muster, the rates established by the
commission cannot be confiscatory. Courts uniformly observe:
Rates which are not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the
value of the property used, at the time it is being used to render the
service, are unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory, and their enforcement deprives the public utility company of its property in violation of
3
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Minnesota, ascertainment of a "fair and reasonable return" is the
product of a number of separate determinations made by the commission
during the proceedings. These determinations, based on a cost of capital
approach, are: (1) the cost of common equity; (2) the cost of preferred
stock; (3) the cost of debt; and (4) the costof any other items considered
part of the capital structure. The commission must also determine the
capital structure appropriate for ratemaking purposes. The cost rate for
each capital item is weighted by the percent of that item in the capital
structure. The commission regards the sum of the weighted cost rates as
4
the authorized overall "fair rate of return."
Defining the appropriate capital structure is of major importance in
determining the overall rate of return. Even a modest adjustment in the
capital structure significantly affects the utility's overall rate of return
The commission, in the exercise of its powers under this chapter to determine
just and reasonable rates for telephone companies, shall give due consideration
to the public need for adequate, efficient, and reasonable service and to the need
of the telephone company for revenue sufficient to enable it to meet the cost of
furnishing the service, including adequate provision for depreciation of its telephone company property used and useful in rendering service to the public, and
to earn a fair and reasonable return upon the investment in such property.

Id. § 237.075(6).
2. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944);
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 690
(1923); Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 302 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn.
1980).
3. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 679, 690 (1923); Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 302

N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 1980).
4. A typical reflection of this process in a recent commission order is as follows:
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and its additional revenue requirement. 5 A severe adjustment in the
capital structure may: (1) seriously impede the utility's ability to compete in the capital markets; (2) ultimately raise the utility's overall cost of
capital to the detriment of both the utility and its ratepayers; and
(3) render the authorized overall return constitutionally insufficient.
Intervenors in general rate proceedings before the commission often
attempt to convince the commission to adopt capital structures for
ratemakin g purposes that differ significantly from the utility's actual
capital structure or the capital structure proposed by the utility for
ratemaking purposes. Responses by the commission to these efforts vary
from utility to utility, and occasionally, from case to case for particular
utilities.
II.

TELEPHONE RATE PROCEEDINGS

In the past decade, the question of what is the appropriate capital
structure for ratemaking purposes has been a significant issue in most
major telephone rate proceedings. The commission treats the matter as a
factual issue and commission decisions vary from case to case depending
largely upon the nature of the expert testimony presented by the parties.
The commission has sometimes expressed its preference for a "double
leverage" capital structure, and in recent years, has generally deviated
from that position when the Department of Public Service (DPS)6 or
other intervenors have failed to present significant double leverage
testimony.
The key telephone rate proceeding in the early 1970's was initiated in
1971 by Northwestern Bell Telephone Company (Bell). Bell sought to
Amount
(000s omitted)

Percent
of Total

Short Term Debt

$ 53,344

2.66%

Long Term Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
Total

919,615
221,525
846,779
2,042,263

45.03
10.85
41.46
100.00%

Cost
15.18%

7.22
6.16
13.77

Weighted
Cost
.40%

3.25
.67
5.71
10.03%

Northern States Power Co., Docket No. G-002/GR-80-556 (Minn. P.U.C. July 24, 1981),
at 21.
5. In the Northern States Power proceedings, id., for example, an increase in debt and a
decrease in common equity of one percent would reduce the overall return by seven basis
points and would reduce the overall revenue requirement by approximately $1.2 million.
6. Prior to 1980, the Department of Public Service consisted of two divisions, the
Administrative Division of the Department and the Public Service Commission. Prior to
1980, the Department's Administrative Division (known as the Participating Department
Staffor PDS) intervened in rate cases. In 1980, Minnesota Statutes, section 216A.01 was
amended to separate the Department and the Commission. Act of Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 614,
§ 103, 1980 Minn. Laws 1436, 1496. Since that time the Department of Public Service
(DPS) has directly intervened in cases.
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obtain a general rate increase. 7 The proceeding involved capital structure issues and the commission's resolution of the issues, subsequently
affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, retains importance today.
Bell proposed the use of the Bell System capital structure at the end of
a test year to determine a new rate of return. Based on this capital structure, Bell's witness recommended an overall rate of return on a fair value
rate base of between 8.4 and 8.5%. The record established the Bell System's debt ratio at 45.14%.8 Two other witnesses, one retained by the
commission and one retained by the state, testified that Bell's debt ratio
was too low and not in the best interest of the ratepayers. While not
advocating adoption of a hypothetical debt ratio, one witness recommended a rate of return of 7.77% on an imputed debt ratio of 53% and a
net book cost rate base. The other witness, although using the Bell System capital structure, recommended a return of 7.5% on a net book cost
rate base. Their recommended returns would have been substantially
lower if applied to a fair value rate base.
The commission's order did not separate the capital structure issue
from the rate of return issue. Rather, the commission merely stated:
The Commission in determining what is an overall fair rate of return
must exercise its considered judgment. After reviewing all of the evidence in this case and the testimony of three expert rate of return witnesses, it is the considered judgment of this Commission that the fair
rate of return which applicant should be permitted to earn on the rate
base adopted herein is 7.5 percent. 9
The commission reviewed the capital structure evidence in some detail
in its subsequent order on reconsideration. It again failed to make an
express capital structure determination for rate of return purposes.
The question of appropriate capital structure also affected the commission's rate base determination. At the time, Minnesota Statutes, section 237.08 required the commission to give "due consideration" to the
"current value" of Bell's property.' 0 Bell argued that the "fair value" of
its property used and useful in providing service equaled the calculated
"current value." To prove calculated current value, Bell presented evidence as to the original cost of its plant, less depreciation, and then
trended original cost upward by approximately thirty percent through
the use of telephone plant price indexes. The state argued that "fair
value" equaled original cost.
7. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 93 P.U.R.3d 106 (Minn. P.S.C. 1972). The general
rates Bell sought to increase in this proceeding had been in effect since April 1958.
8. AT&T's debt ratio was 21.42% and Bell's debt ratio was 35.75%.
9. 93 P.U.R.3d at IlIt.
10. MINN. STAT. § 237.08 (1971), repealed by Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 359, § 8, 1977
Minn. Laws 772, 777. This statute was replaced by a provision providing for an original
cost standard instead of a current cost standard. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 359, § 7, 1977
Minn. Laws 772, 776, codifedat MINN. STAT. § 237.075 (1982).
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The commission, in effect, adopted a reasonable compromise between
the two positions. For the purpose of establishing the rate base, the commission weighted the difference between original cost and current value
according to the common equity percentage contained in Bell's capital
structure. The commission reasoned that this recognized the effects of
inflation on the rate base in respect to equity, but excluded inflation
from that portion of the rate base financed by debt. I
The commission's decision was appealed to the district court and, ultimately, to the Minnesota Supreme Court.' 2 Both courts affirmed the
commission on these issues. t 3 In the supreme court, the state claimed
that weighting current value based on Bell's capital structure was not
supported by the record and that capital structure had no relationship or
relevance to the value of property included in the rate base. The state
also argued that ample evidence proved the Bell capital structure inordinately "thick" and that the commission failed to adequately address the
issue by adjusting the rate of return downward to reflect Bell's low debtequity ratio. The supreme court rejected these arguments and indicated
a predisposition to management discretion in determining the appropriate capital structure:
We have difficulty accepting the concept that in a rate case of this kind
the state may collaterally attack the judgment of the company in maintaining its embedded debt at a low figure. We agree with the position
of the company that this is a discretionary matter of management
which, in the light of soaring interest rates, seems to vindicate the com14
pany's decision to keep its debt obligations to a minimum.
Northwestern Bell's next rate application'

5

again called for the com-

11. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. 0238-TE (Minn. P.S.C. Apr. 7, 1972)
(Supp. Order), at 3-4.
12. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 216 N.W.2d 841 (1974).
13. Id. at 6, 14-15, 28, 216 N.W.2d at 844-45, 850, 857-58.
14. Id. at 14-15, 216 N.W.2d at 850.
This concept has been expressed in other jurisdictions as well. See Pacific Northwest
Bell Tel. Co. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 98 P.U.R.3d 16, 25-26 (Wash. Sup.
Ct. King County 1972); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania,
93 P.U.R.3d 13, 39 (Penn. P.U.C. 1971). The Florida Public Service Commission, in
Florida Power & Light Co., 67 P.U.R.3d 113 (Fla. P.S.C. 1966), set forth the general
rationale for the importance of management discretion with regard to capital structure
matters as follows:
Nevertheless, capital structures, basically, fall within the prerogatives of management, and this is as it should be, because of the impact capital ratios exert on the
ability of the utility to maintain its credit and attract capital. Management lives
from day to day with intricate and complex problems of corporate finance, and
has the responsibility of seeing that the utility has the financial ability to meet its
public duties. The invasion of the field of management in such a sensitive area is
justified only when the public interest requires the exercise of extreme measures
for its protection and benefit.
Id. at 162; see also Tampa Elec. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 398, 416 (Fla. P.S.C. 1971).
15. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. M-5405 (Minn. P.S.C. Nov. 22, 1974).
This rate application was filed in April 1974.
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mission to make capital structure determinations for rate base and rate of
return purposes. In determining the fair value rate base, the commission
continued to utilize Bell's equity ratio of 60.1%. The commission, however, then faced three separate capital structure recommendations for
rate of return purposes. Bell proposed use of an "objective" Bell System
consolidated capital structure,1 6 the state recommended use of the Bell
System's "actual" consolidated capital structure,1 7 and the commission's
consultant advocated use of a so-called "double leverage" capital structure. 18 The consultant claimed double leverage takes into account the
effective cost to a holding company system of financing its operating subsidiaries. Additionally, he claimed that double leverage recognizes differences in capital costs among a parent company's various subsidiaries
and, since the particular subsidiary's capital structure is utilized, it equitably spreads earnings requirements among the subsidiaries while providing the required equity return to the parent.
In its initial decision, the commission failed to separately detail the
capital structure relied upon in establishing Bell's authorized return of
7.97%.19

The commission, however, appeared to endorse the use of

double leverage, stating that "the actual capital structure selected must
recognize the integrated nature of capital financing which exists in a
multi-tiered corporation such as AT&T."20
While the second Bell proceeding wound its way through an appeal to
the district court, a remand proceeding, and two trips to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, 2 1 the commission openly adopted a double leverage cap16. AT&T's objective consolidated capital structure consisted of 52.5% common
equity, 2.5% preferred, and 45% debt.
17. The actual consolidated capital contained less equity and more debt than the
AT&T objective capital structure.
18. The commission consultant's double leverage capital structure contained 48.2%
debt, 4.9% preferred, and 46.9% equity.
19. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. M-5405 (Minn. P.S.C. Nov. 22, 1974). In
fact, it can be argued, based on the commission's initial order, that the commission made
no separate capital structure determination at all. It simply began with the previously
authorized return of 7.5%, added .4% for increased debt costs, and then added .07% to
enable Bell to attract new capital, thus arriving at an overall return that was within the
range of reasonableness expressed by the witness.
20. Id. at 20.
21. This matter reached the supreme court on two occasions: First, on the question of
whether the district court could remand the matter to the commission for further proceedings; second, on the merits of the commission's initial decision and its decision on remand
reducing the authorized rate of return in accordance with the remand order of the district
court. There was, however, no serious dispute on appeal with regard to the commission's
capital structure determinations and the supreme court's opinions do not comment on the
matter.
The supreme court initially found authority in the district court to remand the matter for further proceedings and refused to consider the merits of the matter prior to completion of the remand proceedings. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 310 Minn.
146, 246 N.W.2d 28 (1976). When the court ultimately reached the merits, it concluded
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ital structure in another major telephone company proceeding. Continental Telephone Company of Minnesota, Inc. (ContinentalMinnesota), a wholly owned subsidiary of Continental Telephone Corporation (Continental) and the largest non-Bell telephone company in
Minnesota, filed an application for rate relief on March 7, 1975.22 Continental-Minnesota's rate of return witness testified that the actual capitalization of Continental-Minnesota as of December 31, 1974, adjusted for a
1975 financing of preferred stock, should be utilized. The Participating
Department Staff (PDS) opposed the company proposal and recommended a capital structure based on double leverage. The PDS claimed
double leverage included the effective cost to Continental of financing
the stock of Continental-Minnesota. Continental vigorously objected to
the PDS double leverage recommendations. Continental argued that
double leverage implied a rigid flow of funds that did not exist, discriminated against holding companies because investors in other operating
companies may have also lowered their investment through lower priced
debt, and required ratepayers in other jurisdictions that do not use
double leverage to subsidize Minnesota ratepayers.
Despite this evidence, the commission openly endorsed double leverage as the appropriate capital structure for a wholly owned operating
telephone company, stating:
The Commission finds it appropriate to use a double leveraged

capital structure for the Company. The Commission finds and concludes that the Parent Company used debt and preferred stock in
purchasing the common equity of the Company, and that if the common equity of all the subsidiaries were totalled, it would exceed that of
the Parent Company. If the Commission were not to adopt double
leverage, the Parent Company's Minnesota ratepayers would be required to pay more than their proportionate share of the Parent Company's earnings requirements. The use of double leverage recognizes
the differences in capital costs among the Parent Company's various
subsidiaries. If double leverage were used in each jurisdiction, the Parent Company's earnings requirements would be equitably spread
among the individual subsidiaries, yet the Parent Company would still

have the opportunity to earn its required equity return. The Commission further finds and concludes that the use of double leverage is desirable to provide it with the necessary information required to evaluate

the appropriate capital structure of the Company in Minnesota. The
Commission recognizes that various other jurisdictions in which the
Parent Company has subsidiaries may not employ double leverage.
However, this possibility does not justify the Commission in using a
non-leveraged capital structure which would in effect require the Parent Company's Minnesota ratepayers to subsidize the customers of its
that the district court erred in instructing the commission to reduce the authorized 7.97%
rate of return. The supreme court reinstated the commission's initial rate of return determination. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 253 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1977).
22. Continental Tel. Co., Docket No. PR-121-1 (Minn. P.S.C. Apr. 16, 1976).
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subsidiaries in those jurisdictions which do not use double leverage. 23

The commission reiterated the double leverage principles enunciated
in its Continental decision in the Northwestern Bell case that followed.24
In this proceeding, Bell again proposed an objective capital structure
containing 45% debt.25 Bell justified the proposal by citing a decline in
the Bell System's pretax interest coverage and a need for a greater borrowing power margin to enable them to raise additional capital without
impairing the company's credit rating, the quality of its securities, or its
"AAA" bond rating. Bell also indicated that double leverage effectively
attributed a 55.09% hypothetical debt ratio to the company. 26 Double
leverage also failed to account for the fact that the timing of the issuance
of debt could vary the ratio of debt to equity significantly from year to
year. Bell also pointed out that double leverage was not accepted by the
Federal Communications Commission or ninety percent of the states regulating the Bell System, and its use in Minnesota would deny the parent
company its required rate of return.
The commission rejected Bell's proposed capital structure and arguments and adopted the PDS proposed double leverage capital struc23. Id. at 10.
The double leverage capital structure adopted by the commission for ContinentalMinnesota was computed as follows:
CAPITAL STRUCTURE (December 31, 1974) ADJUSTED FOR PROPOSED
FINANCING
Amount
(000's Omitted)
Continental Telephone-Parent
Common Equity Investment
Continental Telephone of Minnesota
Retained Earnings
Continental Telephone of Minnesota
Common Equity
Continental Telephone-Parent
Preferred Stock Investment
Continental Telephone-Parent LongTerm Debt Investment
Continental Telephone-Parent
Interim Debt Investment
Continental Telephone of Minnesota,
Long-Term Debt
Continental Telephone of Minnesota
Preferred Stock

%

Cost
%

Weighted
Cost %

S 13,991

26.03

12.33

3.21

452

.84

7.80

.07

2,772

5.16

9.45

.49

703

1.31

9.45

.12

31,125

57.91

5.62

3.26

4,700

8.75

9.75

.85

S 4,446
9,545

$ 53,743
100.00
8.00
Id. at 12.
24. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-75-496 (Minn. P.S.C. Oct. 15,
1976).
25. AT&T's consolidated debt ratio was 49.6% at the time.
26. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/BK-75-496 (Minn. P.S.C. Oct. 15,
1976), at 22-23.
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ture. 27 Recognizing the persuasive arguments advanced by both parties,
the commission stated that its primary consideration was the rates paid
by subscribers within its jurisdiction, not the return to AT&T. The commission found, however, that a double leverage capital structure accounted for AT&T financing in subsidiary operating companies and
thereby assured that Minnesota ratepayers contributed their equitable
share of a fair return to the parent company. In the commission's view,
double leverage avoided the possibility of ratepayers in one jurisdiction
subsidizing those in another, an inequity a consolidated capital structure
failed to address. The commission also utilized the double leverage capital structure for purposes of determining the current value adjustment to
be made to the rate base pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section
237.08.28
29
In the subsequent Bell decision arising out of a full general rate case,
the commission made no mention of the double leverage principle endorsed in the prior Continental and Bell proceedings. Bell proposed a
structure based on anticipated end-of-test year figures for the Bell System, excluding Western Electric debt. The PDS, ignoring its former position as the champion of double leverage, proposed a capital structure
that averaged actual year-end 1977 and forecast year-end 1978, including Western Electric equity and debt. The PDS proposed treatment of
Western Electric lowered AT&T's equity by one percentage point and
30
raised debt by the same amount.
The commission adopted the PDS capital structure, finding it appropriate to use an average capital structure when it is to be applied to an
27. The double leverage capital structure adopted by the commission was as follows:
Weighted
Cost
Cost
%
AT&T Common Equity Investment (Incl.

Cony. Pref.)
NWB Retained Earnings

AT&T Preferred Stock Investment
AT&T Debt Investment
NWB Debt

33.90

12.80

4.34

8.71

12.80

1.11

2.30
11.98
43.11
100.00%

7.58
6.45
7.16

.17
.77
3.09
9.48

This decision was appealed to the district court because a number of other issues in
this matter were closely related to issues pending before the supreme court as a result of

appeals in Docket No. M-5405. After the supreme court's decision on the merits in Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 253 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1977), the appeal was voluntarily
dismissed. Accordingly, the commission's capital structure determination was not judicially reviewed.
28. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-75-496 (Minn. P.S.C. Oct. 15,
1976), at 11.

29. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-77-1509 (Minn. P.S.C. Nov.
22, 1978).
30. Id. at 26. The proposed capital structures were as follows:
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average test year rate base.3 ' Furthermore, the commission stated that
the debt of a subsidiary should be included in the capital structure if the
equity of the subsidiary has also been included.3 2 Obviously, since
neither the company nor the intervenors advocated the use of a double
leverage approach, the commission ignored its earlier Continental and Bell
decisions endorsing that methodology.
During 1980 and 1981, the commission issued decisions in five major
telephone rate proceedings. 3 3 In the two Bell proceedings,3 4 the company proposed use of the Bell System's consolidated capital structure.
The Minnesota Department of Public Service's witness countered these
proposals and advocated the adoption of a hypothetical capital structure
containing 55% debt and 45% equity. In the first proceeding, the PDS
witness suggested that if the commission rejected the use of the proposed
hypothetical capital structure, it should adopt an actual capital structure
adjusted for double leverage. The commission, in each instance, adopted
the Bell System's consolidated capital structure, adjusted for Western
35
Electric.
The commission's capital structure determination in the first proceeding was appealed to district court. The DPS and the Office of Consumer
Services (OCS) charged that the commission made two errors when determining appropriate capital structure. First, the commission failed to
support its capital structure determination with adequate findings. SecBell
Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Stock

PDS
45.8%
2.5%
51.7%

Debt
Preferred Stock
Convertible Preferred Stock
Common Equity

46.87%
2.46%
.62%
50.05%

Id.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id. An appeal to district court in this matter was voluntarily dismissed by Bell
after the district court refused to stay the commission's order directing Bell to refund rates
collected under bond while the matter was pending before the commission. Consequently,
the commission's capital structure determination was not subject to judicial review.
33. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 29,
1981); United Tel. Co., Docket No. P-430/GR-80-612 (Minn. P.U.C. June 30, 1981);
United Tel. Co., Docket No. P-430/GR-79-644 (Minn. P.U.C. July 28, 1980); Continental
Tel. Co., Docket No. P-407/GR-79-500 (Minn. P.S.C. May 9, 1980); Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-79-388 (Minn. P.S.C. Apr. 4, 1980).
34. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 29,
1981); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-79-388 (Minn. P.S.C. Apr. 4,
1980).
35. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 29,
1981), at 45; Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-79-388 (Minn. P.S.C.
Apr. 4, 1980), at 73.
In the 1980 decision, Western Electric's debt and equity were included in the capital
structure. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-79-388 (Minn. P.S.C. Apr.
4, 1980), at 73. In the 1981 proceeding, both were excluded. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
Docket No. P-421/GR-80-91 1 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 29, 1981), at 45.
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ond, the commission inappropriately abandoned double leverage as the
proper method for determining capital structure for ratemaking
purposes.
The district court rejected the first contention. 36 Noting that the burden of showing the reasonableness of the proposed capital structure, including justification of the debt to equity ratio, rested with the company,
the court stated that selection of an appropriate capital structure "isa
fact easily ascertained, and. . . supported, by its nature, only by expert
opinion."37 The court found sufficient expert opinion in the record for
the commission's capital structure determination. Specifically, Bell offered three experts who advocated the consolidated capital structure proposed by the company and even a General Services Administration
witness approved the Bell proposal. According to the court, only one
witness called by the DPS testified to the superiority of the debt loaded
hypothetical capital structure, and no study supported the position. The
court concluded that the commission decision reflected the Minnesota
Supreme Court's deference to management discretion in capital structure determinations.
The DPS and OCS's claim that the commission abandoned double
leverage without justification was similarly rejected. 38 The district court
distinguished the 1976 Bell proceeding because there the DPS produced
a witness who testified to the suitability of the double leverage structure.
The DPS and OCS presented no such witness in this proceeding. Their
witness simply suggested that if the commission rejected the hypothetical
capital structure, it should adopt Bell's actual capital structure adjusted
for double leverage. 39 The witness offered no evidence to support the
conclusion other than previous commission practice. The court stated
that "substantial expertise recommended the Bell System consolidated
capital structure" and "it cannot be error to have followed that advice
absent any support, other than historical, for the double leverage capital
system."40 Indeed, the court again recognized, based on the factual nature of the issue and the lack of evidence presented by the intervenors,
that the adoption of a double leverage capital structure would not have
been supported by substantial evidence and would have been erroneous.
In the second Bell decision, the commission rejected hypothetical capi36. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, File Nos. 446272,
445940 (Minn. 2d Dist. Ct. Sept. 8, 1981).
37. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 23-25.
39. Id. at 25. The district court remanded the matter to the commission for further
consideration of three issues and the matter is presently pending before the commission.
Id. Appeals to the supreme court on other issues have been stayed pending completion of
the remand proceedings. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Util.
Comm'n, Nos. CX-81-1036, C3-81-1072 (Minn. Nov. 9, 1981) (order staying appeals).
40. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, File Nos. 446272,
445940 (Minn. 2d Dist. Ct. Sept. 8, 1981), at 25.
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tal structure recommendations by the DPS and adopted the average
1981 Bell System capital structure, adjusted for Western Electric. 4' The
structure contained 49.4% common equity, which the DPS characterized
as too high and, therefore, uneconomic. The commission rejected the
DPS contention because the record failed to support it.42 The commission found that tests performed by DPS may have shown the hypothetical capital structure to be safe, yet disapproved the hypothetical
structure because the DPS failed to establish that the Bell System's actual capital structure was unsafe or resulted in higher costs of capital to
the Bell System than the DPS hypothetical structure. The commission
also recognized the supreme court's high regard for the judgment of
management when determining the appropriate capital structure and
concluded that it would be inappropriate to use a hypothetical capital
structure based on the record in the proceeding.
The three other major telephone rate proceedings during 1980 and
1981 involved Continental-Minnesota 4 3 and United Telephone Company of Minnesota. 44 The commission adopted double leverage capital
45
structures in each instance.
In the Continental decision, the commission found that double leverage
appropriately recognized the mix of parent company financing in its subsidiaries. 46 The commission commented on the use of a consolidated
capital structure approved in the Bell case scarcely a month earlier:
41. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 12,
1981), at 45.
42. Id. Petitions for reconsideration on this issue have been denied by the commission
and the commission's orders have been appealed by various parties to the district court.
43. Continental Tel. Co., Docket No. P-407/GR-79-500 (Minn. P.S.C. May 9, 1980).
44. United Tel. Co. of Minnesota, Docket No. P-430/GR-80-612 (Minn. P.U.C. June
30, 1981); United Tel. Co., Docket No. P-430/GR-79-644 (Minn. P.U.C. July 28, 1980).
45. United Tel. Co., Docket No. P-430/GR-80-612 (Minn. P.U.C. July 30, 1981), at
3; United Tel. Co., Docket No. P-430/GR-80-612 (Minn. P.U.C. July 28, 1980), at 39;
Continental Tel. Co., Docket No. P-407/GR-79-500 (Minn. P.S.C. May 9, 1980), at 32-33.
46. Continental Tel. Co., Docket No. P-407/GR-79-500 (Minn. P.S.C. May 9, 1980),
at 32-33. The commission stated:
[T]he most appropriate capital structure for use in determining the rates to be
charged by Continental Telephone Company of Minnesota is a double leveraged
capital structure. . . . [T]he use of a double leveraged capital structure for
CTM appropriately recognizes the mix of CTC financing in its subsidiaries.
The Commission will follow its double leverage precedents (also see Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, Docket No. P-421/GR-78-496 (October 15, 1976))
and use the accepted method of determining the overall cost of capital to CTC
by use of the unconsolidated parent balance sheet.
Id.
Consistent with its earlier Continental decision, Docket No. PR-121-1 (Minn. P.S.C.
Apr. 16, 1976), at 12, the commission refused to double leverage Continental's retained
earnings on the ground that logic dispelled the assumption that the parent financed retained earnings. Continental Tel. Co., Docket No. P-407/GR-79-500 (Minn. P.S.C. May
9, 1980), at 33.
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[U]se of a consolidated capital structure as a proxy for the subsidiary
capital structure would be an alternative way of recognizing this
financing mix; however, such a method does not recognize the differences in capital costs among the various subsdiaries of the parent. A
double leverage approach does assure that Minnesota ratepayers contribute only their equitable share of return to the parent. The Commission further notes that no parties to this proceeding proposed using
47
the CTC consolidated capital structure as a proxy for that of CTM.
Two months after this Continental decision, the commission decided on
an application for a rate increase filed by United Telephone Company of
Minnesota. United of Minnesota had proposed the use of its own capital
structure consisting of 52% debt and 42% common equity. The PDS proposed use of the consolidated capital structure of United Telecom, the
parent company, consisting of 57.53% debt, 4.95% preferred, and 37.5 1%
common equity. The OCS advocated double leverage. Under the OCS
method, eventually adopted by the commission, the overall cost of capital for the parent became the cost of equity for United. United of Minnesota's cost of debt was utilized, however, since it issued and remained
responsible for repayment of its own debt. These cost rates were then
weighted according to United of Minnesota's actual capital structure for
48
purposes of establishing the overall authorized rate of return.
In United's most recently completed proceeding, the parties stipulated
to the use of essentially the same double leverage methodology that had
been adopted by the commission in the prior proceedings. 49 The stipulation was accepted by the commission without significant comment.50
47.
at 33.
48.
38-39.
49.
3.
50.

Continental Tel. Co., Docket No. P-407/GR-79-500 (Minn. P.S.C. May 9, 1980),
United Tel. Co., Docket No. P-430/GR-79-644 (Minn. P.U.C. July 28, 1980), at
United Tel. Co., Docket No. P-430/GR-80-612 (Minn. P.U.C. June 30, 1981), at
The double leverage methodology reflected in the stipulation is as follows:
United Parent Company

Type of Capital

% of
Capital Structure

Long-term Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
Total

15.85%
4.45
79.7
100.0%

Cost

Weighted Cost

8.34%
9.45
13.6

1.32%
.42
10.84
12.58%

Cost

Weighted Cost

9.56%
12.58

4.77%
6.30
11.07%

United (Minnesota)
Type of Capital

% of
Capital Structure

Long-term Debt
Common Equity
Total

49.9%
50.1
100.0%

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1982

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 7
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

III.

[Vol. 8

GAS AND ELECTRIC PROCEEDINGS

Effective January 1, 1975, following the enactment of Minnesota Statutes, chapter 216B, gas and electric utilities became subject to statewide
regulation by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission for the first
time. In addition to other broad powers, the commission received the
express authority to establish "just and reasonable rates" to be charged
by utilities for retail natural, manufactured or mixed gas service. 51 The
authority to regulate gas and electric utilities necessarily conferred upon
the commission the authority to determine what capital structure is ap52
propriate for ratemaking purposes.
Since the passage of chapter 216B in 1974, there have been a large
number of rate proceedings before the commission involving major gas
and electric utilities.53 The commission's treatment of capital structure
matters in some of the major gas and electric utility proceedings are surveyed below.
The first major commission decision under chapter 216B involved electric rates filed by Northern States Power Company (NSP) immediately
after chapter 216B became effective. 54 In this proceeding, the commis51. MINN. STAT. §§ 216B.03, .16(6) (1982).
52. The commission was also given authority to control the issuance of securities.
Minnesota Statutes, section 216B.49, subdivision 3, makes it unlawful for a gas or electric
public utility organized under the laws of Minnesota to offer or sell any security or, if
organized under the laws of any other state or foreign country, to encumber property in
Minnesota unless the capital structure of the utility is approved by the commission. Prior
to approval of an issuance of securities, the commission must find "that the proposed
capital structure is reasonable and proper and in the public interest and will not be detrimental to the interests of the consumers and patrons affected thereby." MINN. STAT.
§ 216B.49(4) (1982).
The commission generally takes the position that approval of any particular capital
structure under this statute is not controlling for ratemaking purposes. North Central
Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR-77-235 (Minn. P.S.C. Apr. 4, 1977), at 2 (while
approving issuance of mortgage bonds, commission reserved right to use different capital
structure for ratemaking purposes); Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-79945 (Minn. P.S.C. Mar. 5, 1980), at 4 (approved of capital structure adjustments with
reservation of right to use different capital structure for ratemaking). This position is in
accord with the interpretation afforded 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(8) (1976), which allows the
Federal Communications Commission to review corporate borrowings. See Communications Satellite Corp. (COMSAT) v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 611 F.2d 883
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
53. For example, through mid-1981, Northern States Power Company filed nine separate rate proceedings totalling in excess of $396 million. Minnesota Power & Light Company filed five for more than $184 million. Minnesota Gas Company filed two for more
than $45 million. Interstate Power Company had filed seven, totalling more than $15
million. In addition, 37 rate proceedings were instituted by other gas and electric utilities
during this period. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE, UTILITY FILINGS
FOR RATE INCREASE BY UTILITY 1-6. In addition, there have been a number of applications for approval for changes in capital structure filed pursuant to Minnesota Statutes,
section 216B.49 (1982).
54. See Northern States Power Co., Docket No. ER-2-1 (Minn. P.S.C. Oct. 15, 1976).
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sion chose between three alternative capital structures presented by various witnesses. The NSP witness recommended use of an average yearend 1974 and year-end 1975 capital structure, adjusted to reflect a
planned sale of common stock in August 1975. The PDS witness advocated use of NSP's actual capital structure as of March 31, 1975, adjusted to reflect financing through May and the planned issuance of
common stock. A third witness proposed a pro forma capital structure,
using differing determination dates for debt, preferred, and equity.
Without any significant discussion, the commission concluded that the
capital structure to be used was the average capital structure for the 1975
test year. The commission noted:
The object of fixing an overall rate of return is to permit NSP the opportunity to achieve [the authorized] rate of return. Use of any capitalization other than the average capitalization would not be consistent
with giving NSP the opportunity to achieve the rate of return allowed
55
during this first year that rates are in effect.
Contrary to NSP's proposal, however, the commission refused to adjust

the average capital structure for the August sale of 1,750,000 shares common stock, finding that the adjustment would not have a significant im56
pact on the average 1975 capital structure.

The next commission decision involving a major gas utility concerned
7
an application for a rate increase filed by Otter Tail Power Company.5
While substantial dispute existed between Otter Tail and the PDS as to

the cost of common equity, the parties apparently did not quarrel about
the appropriate capital structure to be used in the rate of return determination.58 The commission's decision ignores the capital structure issue; it
merely reflects the use of a structure containing 49.52% long-term debt,
7.35% short-term debt, 13.89% preferred stock, and 29.24% common equity in arriving at a 9.158% overall rate of return. 59
The third commission decision of importance involved Minnesota
At that time, NSP provided electric service to nearly three million people in a 40,000
square mile service area in Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and South Dakota. It
also distributed gas to St. Paul and 77 other communities in Minnesota, Wisconsin and
North Dakota; provided steam heating service in downtown St. Paul; and provided telephone service in the Minot, North Dakota area. Electric revenues accounted for about
83% of its total business and 80% of its electric revenues were derived from Minnesota. Id.
at 6-7.
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id.
57. Otter Tail Power Co., Docket No. ER-17-1 (Minn. P.S.C. Feb. 26, 1976). Otter
Tail Power Company filed the application in April 1975. The company, headquartered in
Fergus Falls, is an investor owned operating electric utility that serves portions of rural
Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
58. Presumably no issue was raised because the common equity ratio was low and the
cost of the preferred stock closely resembled the cost of Otter Tail's debt.
59. Otter Tail Power Co., Docket No. ER-17-1 (Minn. P.S.C. Feb. 26, 1976), at 7-8.
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Power & Light Company (MP&L).6 ° The capital structure proposed by
MP&L, the capital structure proposed by the PDS, and the capital structure adopted by the commission differed somewhat. 6 1 The commission
in its order provided no explanation for the adoption of a compromise
between the proposals of the utility and the PDS.62

The commission handed down three decisions involving major gas or
electric utilities in 1977, two concerning NSP,63 and one involving North
Central Public Service Company. 64 In the NSP electric rate case, 65 NSP
again proposed use of an average capital structure for the test year which
pegged equity at 36.7%, an amount greater than in its first case.6 6 NSP
testified that it desired to attain a common equity capitalization of 40%
in order to maintain its bond rating. The PDS, on the other hand, proposed the use of a hypothetical capital structure containing 32.6% equity,
an amount .09% less than had been approved in NSP's first case. The
PDS strongly opposed allowing NSP to move to a 40% equity ratio.
In its decision, the commission again approved the use of an average
capital structure when a projected test period is being used. 67 The commission also adopted NSP's equity ratio, stating:
Capital structure found by this method is also subject to a test for reasonableness. The only time the average capital structure during the test period
would not be appropriateis when the proposedcapital structure is unreasonable.

In the instant case, the 36.7% common equity proposed by NSP is not
an unreasonable level of common equity. The finding of reasonableness in the instant case is based upon the facts and circumstances of
record in this case. The Commission does not mean to indicate approval of
NSP's stated objectives with regardto its future capitalstructure by this decision.
60. Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-76-408 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec.
17, 1976). MP&L, an investor owned utility headquartered in Duluth, provides electric
energy to retail customers in a large portion of northeastern Minnesota and wholesale
electric power to municipal and cooperative distribution systems in Minnesota and to its
subsidiary, Superior Water, Light & Power Company, in Superior, Wisconsin.
61.
Commission
PDS
MP&L
47.95
47.97
47.92
Long term Debt
4.28
4.29
4.28
Short term Debt
11.90
11.91
11.89
Preferred Stock
35.87
35.83
35.81
Common Equity
Id. at 36 & Appendix A at 41.
62. Id.
63. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. G-001/GR-76-3627 (Minn. P.S.C. Sept.
19, 1977) (gas rates); Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-76-934 (Minn.
P.S.C. Mar. 2, 1977) (electric rates).
64. North Central Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR-77-221 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec.
30, 1977) (gas rates).
65. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-76-934 (Minn. P.S.C. Mar. 2,
1977).
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id.
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The Commission can reevaluate whether the capital structure of the Company is
reasonable if the common equity component of the capital structure continues to
increase. 68
In the 1977 NSP gas proceeding, 69 the company again proposed use of
the average actual capital structure for the test year. By the time of this
proceeding, the equity component in NSP's capital had increased to
38.51%, a figure approaching NSP's previously stated objective of 40%.
NSP reiterated the necessity of an equity component of 40% in order to
maintain its financial position in the face of increased construction and
to prevent the downgrading of its bonds. The PDS repeated its recommendation of a hypothetical capital structure. It recommended 35%
equity, up 2.4% from the figure previously recommended in the 1977
electric proceeding. The PDS claimed the hypothetical equity amount
would be more economical for the ratepayers, yet was high enough to
maintain NSP's financial integrity.
In its order adopting NSP's proposed capital structure and allowing an
overall return of 9.05%, the commission stated:
The Examiner's Report suggested that the equity component is largely
a judgmental factor which is perhaps best left to the discretion of management, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company v. State, 216 N.W.2d 841,
850, and recommended that NSP's proposed 38.51% equity ratio be
adopted. The Commission finds that NSP's proposal is within a range
70
of reasonableness and will therefore defer to management discretion.
The commission, however, also cautioned NSP that "[w]ere the equity
ratio to exceed 40%, the Commission would adopt a hypothetical equity
ratio."71
The determination of the appropriate capital structure was hotly contested in the 1977 decision involving North Central Public Service Co.72
The dispute revolved around North Central's operation as a division of
Donovan Companies, Inc. 73 The several subsidiaries of Donovan Companies, including North Central, engage in diverse business activities and
other merchandising activity.
North Central testified that the appropriate capital structure for
ratemaking purposes could be determined one of two ways: First, the
Donovan unconsolidated capital structure could be used. Second, for
purposes of ascertaining the equity component, all of Donovan's invest68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-76-3627 (Minn. P.S.C. Sept.
19, 1977).
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id.
72. North Central Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR-77-221 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec.
30, 1977).
73. Donovan Companies, Inc., is an Iowa corporation. North Central distributes natural gas in portions of Minnesota and Iowa, sells propane and engages in other merchandising activities.
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ments in its subsidiaries and the net worth of operating divisions outside
Minnesota could be eliminated from Donovan's capital structure, and all
long term debt secured by North Central's assets could represent the debt
component. Use of either method resulted, according to North Central,
in a equity debt ratio of 51% to 49%.
The PDS proposed use of a hypothetical capital structure of 40% equity and 60% debt. The PDS based its recommendation on its witness'
view that it was impossible to determine a capital structure solely for
North Central because it was not a separate corporate entity or a stock
issuing company. The PDS rejected use of Donovan's capital structure
because Donovan was not a pure utility. The PDS proposed hypothetical capital structure resulted from an averaging of twelve retail gas distri74
bution companies in the Value Line data base.
The commission carefully considered the capital structure issue, first
focusing upon whether it could impose a hypothetical capital structure,
and then considering whether it should do so in this case. Not unexpectedly, the commission concluded that it could impose a hypothetical capital structure if the utility's actual capital structure was unreasonable. In
reaching this determination the commission considered the supreme
court's opinion in Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State75 and concluded
that although the court viewed capital structure as a matter of management discretion, the commission was not foreclosed from the imposition
of hypothetical structures in rate cases where the company's actual structure was unreasonable. 76 The commission supported its opinion by quoting the statement of a leading authority on utility regulation:
The right of commissions to consider this area [capital structure] in setting rates cannot be questioned, since a commission has an obligation
to protect the consumer from excessive wages, excessive pension provision, excessive prices for purchased materials and supplies, and other
such things, including excessive costs of capital. On the other hand, the
right, while always there, should be exercised sparingly, since the
problems of corporate finance are extremely intricate and complex,
and are best known to the utility which lives with these problems from
77
day to day.
The commission, however, then reluctantly decided that the record
before it failed to support the imposition of a hypothetical capital structure. 78 The commission observed that, although North Central was simply a division of Donovan Companies, it possessed an historically
74. See id.
75. 299 Minn. 1, 216 N.W.2d 841 (1974).
76. North Central Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-101/GR-77-221 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec.
30, 1977), at 14-15.
77. Id. at 15, quoting P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILrrY ECONOMICS 130

(1964).
78. Id. at 15-16.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss2/7

18

Brehl and Gallagher: Review of Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Decisions Regardi
CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS

attributed capital structure usable for rate proceedings. 79 Furthermore,
the PDS failed to furnish a rationale for rejecting the use of either North
Central's historically attributed capital structure or Donovan Companies' unconsolidated capital structure.8 0 The commission found no reason to believe the hypothetical capital structure proposed by the PDS
was more desirable than North Central's proposals.8 t Expressing doubt
as to whether either of the two capital structures the company proposed
were within the range of reasonableness, the commission stated that it
must accept one of them because the PDS failed to offer a viable alternative 8 2 The commission adopted the capital structure of Donovan Companies on an unconsolidated basis, but stated its suspicion that the equity
components of the adopted capital structure remained unreasonably
high. 8 3 Finally, the commission cautioned North Central and the PDS
that "[s]hould the company file a future rate case and propose a similar
capital structure, the commission will expect the PDS to carefully scrutinize this structure and offer an acceptable alternative."84
The commission, in 1978, addressed capital structure issues in three
major gas and electric utilities decisions. These decisions involved Min86
8
nesota Power & Light Company, 5 Northern States Power Company,
87
and Minnesota Gas Company.
In the MP&L case, 88 one of the capital structure issues related to the
amount of short-term debt to be included in the capital structure.
MP&L included $1,000,000 of short-term debt while the PDS recommended $5,000,000 of short-term debt, half of MP&L's emergency credit
line of $10,000,000.89 The PDS argued that the flexibility represented by
the emergency credit line was maintained primarily for benefit of MP&L
stockholders, who should pay for it. As an alternative to including
79. Id. at 16.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Earlier in 1977, North Central had sought and obtained permission from the
commission to sell $5 million of first mortgage bonds secured by its natural gas distribution assets. The commission approved that issuance of securities in North Central Pub.
Serv. Co., Docket No. G-101/GR-77-235 (Minn. P.S.C. Apr. 4, 1977), specifically finding
that a capital structure containing 69.7% common equity was "reasonable and proper and
in the public interest and [would] not be detrimental to the consumers and patrons affected thereby." Id. at 2. The commission specifically reserved the right to use a different
capital structure for purposes of setting rates to be paid by North Central's retail customers. Id.
84. North Central Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR-77-221 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec.
30, 1977), at 16.
85. Docket No. E-015/GR-77-360 (Minn. P.S.C. Feb. 3, 1978).
86. Docket No. E-002/GR-77-611 (Minn. P.S.C. Mar. 20, 1978).
87. Docket No. G-008/GR-77-1237 (Minn. P.S.C. Oct. 2, 1978).
88. Docket No. E-015/GR-77-360 (Minn. P.S.C. Feb. 3, 1978).
89. MP&L's credit line was for use in emergencies or in the case of unforeseen
problems in long-term financing.
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$5,000,000 in short-term debt, the PDS recommended that 0.025%,
which corresponded to the commitment fee necessary to maintain the
line of credit, should be eliminated from the short-term debt component
in the capital structure. 9° The examiner accepted MP&L's position that
$1,000,000 was the appropriate dollar level of short-term debt, but also
accepted the PDS recommendation to reduce the short-term debt component in the capital structure by 0.025% due to the commitment fee.
The commission, without any separate analysis or discussion, agreed and
reduced the debt component of MP&L's capital structure. 91
The parties also disputed how Superior Water, Light & Power Company (Superior), MP&L's wholly owned subsidiary, should be treated for
capital structure purposes. MP&L included its equity investment in Superior in its proposed capital structure, but excluded Superior's debt.
The PDS initially recommended removal of all the Superior equity from
the capital structure. After MP&L testified that for ratemaking purposes
the Wisconsin commission prorated Superior's capital structure, however, the PDS modified its recommendation and urged that Superior's
common equity and preferred stock be eliminated from MP&L's capital
structure on a prorated basis. This reduced MP&L's common equity by
approximately $4.6 million and preferred stock by approximately $1.6
million. The examiner adopted the PDS revised recommendation and
the commission again followed the recommendation without significant
92
discussion.
90. Commitment fees for MP&L's credit line totalled $105,000 annually, and if applied to $1,000,000 of short-term debt, would result in an effective cost of 16.5%. If applied to $5,000,000 of short-term debt, the commitment fee would result in an effective
cost of 8.10%.
91. Id. at 20.

92. Id.
The real dispute in this case, as in most, centered upon the return on common equity

allowed MP&L. The commission followed its so-called "North Central doctrine" (accepting
the lowest rate of return recommendation that withstood cross-examination) and established a return on common equity of 13%. In doing so, the commission noted:
A rate of return of 13.0% on common equity will maintain MP&L's pre-tax coverage including AFDC above 3.5% for the test year. This is the figure which
Standard & Poor's told the Company it must maintain to keep its A bond rating.
While coverage ratios will slide in the latter half of 1978, we expect the Com-

pany will soon return for rate relief and that we will be able to address this
problem under the facts as they then exist.

Id. at 28.
Even prior to the decision, however, MP&L's bonds were downgraded. In addition,
shortly after the decision, MP&L was unable to sell common equity at book value. In
April 1978, a sale of $1,500,000 of common stock brought net income to MP&L of 96% of
book value and an issuance in March 1979, brought only 86% of book value.
On appeal, the district court determined that a 13.0% return on equity was an insufficient rate of return and concurred with the examiner's decision that the appropriate range
for return on equity was between 13.25% and 14.0%. The Minnesota Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed that determination. Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 302 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 1980). In addition to rejecting the North Central doctrine,
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In the 1978 NSP decision,93 the capital structure issue avoided serious
scrutiny because NSP remained below the 40% equity level established in
the earlier NSP decision.94 The PDS also accepted as reasonable NSP's
estimates of its cost of long-term debt, preferred stock, and short-term
debt. The commission adopted the stipulated figures and the proposed
capital structure, noting its directive in the most recent NSP gas case in
which it approved an equity component approaching 40% as reasonable
and rejected the PDS hypothetical capital structure. 95
In October 1978, the commission issued its decision on the first rate
increase application filed by Minnesota Gas Company (Minnegasco)96
since statewide regulation began in 1975. According to the commission's
decision, Minnegasco avoided a general rate increase during the first few
years of statewide regulation because, immediately prior to the implementation of statewide regulation, the company raised its rates significantly to offset rising costs in subsequent years. 9 7 The commission
pointed out that previous regulatory freedom allowed management to
devise and implement financial policies that provided investors with
financial protection. The commission concluded that "[t]his fact makes
Minnegasco's record of growth unique and helps explain its strong market to book ratios throughout years of trial for the industry generally."98
While Minnegasco's capital structure avoided serious dispute, the
commission relied on the company's strong capital structure as justification for allowing a reduced rate of return. The capital structure proposed by Minnegasco contained 42.63% long-term debt, 5.22% shortterm debt, 10.29% preferred stock, and 41.86% common equity. The
commission expressed doubts about the reasonableness of the common
equity component, but accepted it and Minnegasco's proposed capital
structure because no party challenged the proposal. 99 It is clear from the
commission's decision, however, that it took Minnegasco's 41.86% equity
ratio into account in establishing a return on equity of 12.47%; a return
less than those allowed in recent proceedings involving NSP, Otter Tail
the supreme court particularly noted that in the 1976 MP&L proceeding the commission
had determined that 13.25% was MP&L's minimum rate of return on common equity and
there was nothing in the record which indicated why that position should be abandoned
one year later. The supreme court also noted that MP&L's bonds had been downgraded
from "A" to "A-" during the proceedings. Id. at 12.
93. Docket No. E-002/GR-77-611 (Minn. P.S.C. Mar. 20, 1978).
94. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
95. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-77-611 (Minn. P.S.C. Mar. 20,
1978), at 20.
96. Docket No. G-008/GR-77-1237 (Minn. P.S.C. Oct. 2, 1978).
Minnesota Gas Company is a natural gas distribution utility serving approximately
225 communities in Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota and Iowa. The major communities served in Minnesota include Minneapolis and its suburbs.
97. Id. at 40-41 & n.5.
98. Id. at 42.
99. Id. at 31.
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Power Company, and MP&L.100 The commission noted Minnegasco's
extremely strong capital structure, and found its equity ratio to be higher
than any regulated utility in Minnesota. Commenting that Minnegasco's high equity ratio represented considerable protection to equity
holders and indicated unsurpassed financial strength and integrity, the
commission reiterated its position stated in the 1978 NSP case that a
"40% equity ratio . . . represented 'the very upward limit of the point

which the commission deemed reasonable.' "101 The commission concluded that it could not "ignore the considerable element of financial
protection that this structure provides the investor, and its correspondent
effect on the perceived risk of Minnegasco vis-a-vis other regulated utilities with substantially greater debt leverage."102
In 1979, the commission issued additional decisions involving
MP&L 103 and NSP.104 In the MP&L matter, the commission considered

two capital structure issues. The quarrel over the treatment of the cost of
maintaining MP&L's credit line continued, and the commission again
excluded commitment fees for short term financing from the capital
structure. 105
The second capital structure issue concerned whether $111,000,000 of
pollution control bond proceeds should be included in the capital structure from the time of issuance of the bonds or from the time the proceeds
were withdrawn from the trust fund for use by MP&L. The OCS and
the PDS favored immediate inclusion, whereas MP&L included the pro10 6
ceeds as they were released to the company by the indenture trustee.
For purposes of establishing MP&L's rate of return, the commission utilized a capital structure containing 35.65% equity, 10.58% preferred
stock, and 53.77% long term debt. 10 7 It rejected including the unused
bond proceeds, stating that inclusion would have a significant and adverse impact on the company's equity ratio and resultant coverage ratio,
that neither the PDS or OCS addressed these serious ramifications, and
100. See id.
101. Id. at 43, quoting Northern States Power Co., Docket No. 002/GR-77-611 (Minn.
P.S.C. Mar. 20, 1978), at 13; see supra notes 63-71 & 94-95 and accompanying text.
102. Minnesota Gas Co., G-008/GR-77-1237 (Minn. P.S.C. Oct. 2, 1978), at 43.
103. Docket No. E-015/GR-78-514 (Minn. P.S.C. Apr. 9, 1979).
104, Docket No. G-002/GR-78-0152 (Minn. P.S.C. Sept. 21, 1979).
105. Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-78-514 (Minn. P.S.C. Apr.
9, 1979), at 63-64.
106. The company invested the unused proceeds of the pollution control bonds in
short term commercial paper and government securities yielding a higher interest rate
than MP&L's cost of the bonds. MP&L claimed that this was the first reinvestment in its
history to be placed at a return greater than cost. In all other cases of prefinancing where
capital funds were invested until needed, the return on investment was less than the capital cost and the loss had been absorbed by MP&L shareholders. Id. at 62.
107. Id. at 64. In this case, the commission allowed MP&L only a 13% return on equity. It also, however, allowed MP&L a current return on a substantial portion of its
construction work in progress. Id. at 10, 22.
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that the record was undeveloped on the potentially adverse consequences
to the company, its investors, and the ratepayers. 0 8
In the 1979 NSP decision, the commission, true to its prior admonitions to NSP, adopted a hypothetical capital structure containing 40%
equity and shifted 1.56% of equity to the long term debt component of
the capital structure. 09 The average test year capital structure proposed
by NSP for the test year ending December 31, 1979, contained 41.56%
equity."10 NSP testified that growth in equity since 1976 resulted from
NSP's dividend reinvestment program, its employee stock ownership
plan, and additional retained earnings. The objective capital structure
was stated to be 40 to 42% common equity. NSP's witnesses testified that
increased business risks required such a capital structure. Furthermore,
the proposed structure would enable NSP to avoid selling securities in
unfavorable markets.
The witness for the City of St. Paul testified that a capital structure
with an equity component of 35 to 40% would be appropriate. Comparing NSP's equity ratio with the average for a group of normalized electric and gas utilities whose bonds had been rated "AA," the witness
found that during 1978 and 1979 NSP's equity component exceeded the
average of the group. The witness concluded that NSP's equity ratio
surpassed that necessary to maintain a "AA" rating. After examining
the pretax interest coverage necessary to maintain a "AA" bond rating,
the witness testified that the adoption of the city's recommended capital
structure would continue to provide NSP with a pretax interest coverage
ratio greater than Standard & Poors' requirement for a "AA" rating.
Both the OCS and the PDS used NSP's proposed test year capital
structure in determining NSP's overall cost of capital. Their witnesses,
however, testified that NSP's equity ratio equaled the "upper limits of a
necessary or reasonable ratio." The examiner also adopted NSP's proposed equity ratio for purposes of determining NSP's cost of capital.
The commission, on the other hand, found unconvincing the company's explanation for exceeding the clearly articulated limit of reasonableness of 40%. It rejected NSP's capital structure, stating:
The Commission has plainly stated its concern that an overly high
equity ratio will impose too great an effective cost of capital on NSP's
ratepayers. Company management has had the 40% upper limit as a
guide for their choices and actions since September 1977. They have

been put on notice that the Commission would take corrective action if
that 40% point were to be passed.
The City of St. Paul suggested several ways in which the Company
108. Id. at 63.
109. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-78-0152 (Minn. P.S.C. Sept.
21, 1979), at 31-32.
110. Id. at 28. NSP's equity ratio had been on a purposeful upward trend, moving
from 29.4% (with short term debt) in 1968 to 40.5% (with short term debt) in 1978. Id.
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could have controlled equity expansion. The Commission is willing to
allow NSP's management to pursue whatever course of action they feel
is prudent in regard to the manner of issuing common equity. The
Commission is here concerned about the proper level of equity to be
used for rate-making purposes. The actual level of equity has now
risen above the level repeatedly labeled as reasonable by the
Commission.
Therefore, the Commission will adopt a hypothetical capital structure for NSP. The common equity position will be 40%, the upper
limit of reasonableness. The capitalization removed from the equity
component will be shifted to the long-term debt component. This
shifted capitalization will be included at a cost of 9.50%, which is the
recommendation of [St. Paul's witness], and which represents the approximate current cost of long-term debt to the Company.
The Commission further states that it will continue to give 40% as
the maximum reasonable equity rate for NSP until it is clearly and
convincingly shown that any higher ratio would be reasonable. If the
equity ratio remains above the reasonable maximum, the Commission
will continue to use a theoretical capital structure in future cases."'
In April 1981, the commission issued another decision on a Northern
States Power Company application.i 12 By the time of this decision, NSP
had reacted to the commission's 1979 order that adopted a hypothetical
capital structure and had taken action to attempt to reduce its common
equity level. In March 1980, NSP began to use market stock for its employee stock ownership plan and dividend reinvestment plan, rather
than issuing new common stock. It also purchased approximately $1.5
million shares of common stock through market and block transactions
by August 1980. As a result of these actions, NSP's proposed capital
structure in this proceeding for the projected test year contained an equity ratio of 42.23%.113
NSP argued that the increase in the common equity ratio to 42.23%
resulted from actions necessary to increase the inadequate equity ratios
111. Id. at 31-32.
112. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-80-316 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr.
30, 1981).
113. Id. at 25. This equity ratio was higher than the ratio the commission had rejected
in the 1979 proceeding. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. In February 1980,
however, the commission had approved substantial changes in NSP's capital structure
under Minnesota Statutes, section 216B.49. More specifically, by its order in Northern
States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-79-945 (Minn. P.U.C. Feb. 20, 1980), the commission had approved the issuance of $45 million worth of common stock, up to $50 million of first mortgage bonds, up to $8 million of pollution control revenue bonds, and up
to $100 million of unsecured short-term promissory notes to be issued to commercial banks
and to be used for commercial paper transactions. Id. at 1-5. As noted in that order, as of
December 31, 1978, December 31, 1979, and December 31, 1980, NSP (Minnesota) would
have a capital structure containing 41.9%, 43.6% and 46.3% common equity. Id. at 2.
NSP (consolidated) would have a capital structure containing 40.5%, 42.3%, and 44.4%
common equity on the same dates. Id.
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of the mid and early 1970's, the advantageous use of dividend reinvestment in employee stock ownership plans, and the necessary cancellation
of some debt offerings. NSP maintained that it had taken every reasonable action to attempt to limit or actually reduce its common equity ratio following the commission's previous orders. The company claimed its
equity ratio paralleled other "AAA" rated electrics and that a developing concensus within the financial community indicated that the electric
utility industry should achieve higher common equity ratios. Industry
ratios had increased in recent years with most, if not all, "AA" electric
utilities raising their equity ratios to over 40%. NSP also asserted that its
target equity ratio of 40 to 42% was necessary to properly reflect the risks
of the electric utility business and to provide financial flexibility. The
expansion in the test year equity level above the 42% target, the company claimed, would not result in increased costs to consumers in the
long run and would allow NSP needed financial flexibility.
The DPS and OCS recommended use of a 40% hypothetical equity
ratio, claiming that NSP's actual equity ratio was excessively high and
imposed an unnecessary financial burden on ratepayers. Their witness
testified that the 1979 equity ratio for twenty-seven "AA" normalized
electrics averaged only 37.5% and that in 1979, NSP's pretax interest
coverage ratio ranked second among all the electric utilities companies.
According to their witness, using both the DPS and OCS recommended
capital structure and return on capital, NSP's pretax interest coverage
would be 4.23; a level the witness regarded as adequate to maintain
NSP's "AA" rating.
The hearing examiner found that NSP's estimated test year capital
structure should be used in determining the overall rate of return. The
examiner stated that the concept of a hypothetical capital structure is
nothing more than a technique to reduce the overall cost of capital by
declaring by fiat that the proportion of common equity shall be deemed
for ratemaking purposes to be something less than it is in reality. The
examiner also noted that in view of the diminishing spread between the
cost of equity and the cost of debt, and in view of NSP's serious efforts to
reduce its equity levels, the test year equity level of 42.23% was not
unreasonable.
NSP's argument prevailed and the commission approved the use of
NSP's estimated test capital structure for calculating the overall rate of
return to be allowed NSP, despite the 40% limitation established in
1979.114 The commission specifically found a good faith effort by NSP to
move toward a more reasonable capital structure in response to the commission's prior orders. The commission also recognized changed circumstances since its previous determination of a 40% upper limit of
114. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-80-316 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr.
30, 1981), at 26.
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reasonableness. Specifically, the commission noted that inflation and
financial market conditions in the test year indicated that NSP and its
customers may benefit from the increased financial flexibility afforded
NSP by its new equity level. The commission, however, added the caveat that it "retains an active interest in seeing that NSP's equity ratios
stay within reasonable limits and reserves the right to re-examine the
appropriateness of NSP's equity ratio if circumstances warrant."' 15
In April 1981, the commission also considered an Otter Tail Power
Company (Otter Tail) rate application.116 Otter Tail filed a forecast
year-end 1980 capital structure consisting of 50.58% long-term debt,
16.76% preferred stock, and 32.66% common equity. Otter Tail argued
that the rate levels it requested were designed to be operative into the
future and that the use of the year-end capital structure matched recent
capital costs with future rates. Because the company recently experienced a dramatic rise in both its current and embedded cost of debt,
Otter Tail argued that any capital structure other than the one forecasted to exist at the end of the test year seriously understated its cost of
capital for the effective period of the rates to be established by the
commission. 117
Otter Tail suggested, as an alternative to the forecast year-end capital
structure, that its "goal" capital structure consisting of 50% long-term
debt, 13% preferred stock, and 37% common equity be utilized. Otter
Tail argued that adoption of its "goal" capital structure would support
its "A" bond rating.
The DPS proposed the use of a test year average capital structure consisting of 51.09% long-term debt, 16.30% preferred stock, and 32.61%
common equity. The DPS derived these figures by averaging the actual
capital structure of December 31, 1979 with the company's forecast of its
year-end 1980 capital structure. It argued that this represented the reasonable balance between known and forecast figures and matched the
test year average rate base used in the proceeding.
The commission rejected the DPS recommendations and adopted Otter Tail's forecast year-end capital structure as appropriate. Facts that
convinced the commission to deviate from its prior decisions approving
an average test year capital structure included:
(a) Otter Tail's participation in active financing during the test
period;
115. Id.
116. Otter Tail Power Co., Docket No. E-017/GR-80-277 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 13,
1981).
117. Id. at 18. No one disputed Otter Tail's forecast of its embedded cost of long-term
debt of 8.48% on December 31, 1980, or its cost of preferred stock of 8.46% on that date.
Id. Similarly, there was no dispute as to the forecast levels of long-term debt, preferred
stock, and common equity as of December 31, 1980. Id. at 19.
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(b) Current costs of long-term debt and preferred stock remained
well above embedded cost levels;
(c) The rates reflective of the year-end capital structure became effective only after half the test year passed and those rates were "likely to
exist for at least 6 months beyond the test year"; and
(d) Otter Tail's proposed year-end capital structure forecasted a
"reasonable measure of the relative levels of long-term debt, preferred
stock, and common equity associated with provision of service during
this time."118

In mid-June 1981, the commission issued its decision on North Central's second rate application since the initiation of regulations in
1975.119 Consistent with the commission's decision in North Central's
1977 rate application, the company proposed the use of the test year average capital structure of Donovan Companies, Inc., on an unconsolidated basis. This capital structure contained 55.06% common equity
and 44.94% debt.
The DPS and OCS sponsored witness testified that North Central's
equity ratio exceeded the level appropriate for a gas distribution company and that the high equity ratio increased the overall cost of capital
and placed an unnecessary burden on North Central's ratepayers. Their
witness proposed a hypothetical capital structure containing 45% equity
and 55% debt. The witness based the recommendation on a determination that the average common equity ratio of sixteen companies studied
was 44.8% at the year end 1979 and that the average common equity
ratio of gas companies listed in the Value Line Investment Survey was
44.5% for the same period. He claimed none of the sixteen companies
studied had a common equity ratio as high as Donovan's.
During rebuttal, North Central vigorously opposed the imposition of a
hypothetical capital structure on three grounds. First, North Central indicated that some of the companies studied had higher common equity
ratios than Donovan. Second, North Central disputed the DPS/OCS
witness' treatment of the preferred stock of the studied gas companies as
debt, instead of equity capital. If the preferred stock of the companies
studied was treated as equity capital, Donovan's capital structure, which
did not include any preferred stock, neared the median of the group of
companies studied. Third, North Central pointed out that imputation of
preferred stock to the company based on an average would increase the
difficulty of meeting coverage requirements on the company's bond indentures and might foreclose the issuance of new debt.
Finding the DPS/OCS witness "singularly unpersuasive," the commis118. Id.
119. North Central Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR-80-472 (Minn. P.U.C. June
19, 1981).
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sion rejected the proposed use of a hypothetical capital structure.120 The
commission faulted the witness' use of 1979 data to establish an equity
ratio for the test year of 1981, while the witness recognized the existence
of a trend towards higher common equity ratios for gas distribution companies.121 The commission criticized the witness for treating preferred
stock as debt, while at the same time recognizing that preferred stock
resembled equity, with tax consequences similar to common stock and a
cost higher than that of debt.122 The commission also noted that the
witness failed to respond to the company's contention that the
DPS/OCS proposed hypothetical capital structure would render North
1
Central unable to issue debt under the terms of its bond indenture. 23
Finally, the witness did not show that the hypothetical capital structure
was desirable, or establish the reasonableness or desirability of the individual capital structures of the sixteen companies on which the proposal
was based, as required in the previous North Central case. 124 The commission concluded:
The Commission finds that equity ratios of natural gas distribution
companies have been increasing recently; that because the Company
has no preferred stock its common equity ratio can be higher than that
of a gas distribution company which has preferred stock; that the Company's equity ratio is not out of line with the equity ratios of comparison companies; and that no testimony has shown the Company's
25
proposed capital structure to be unreasonable.'

The commission's most recent decision in a pending NSP case was issued in July 1981.126 NSP again proposed to use the average capital
structure for the test year to calculate its weighted cost of capital. As
originally presented, the projected common equity ratio was 43.14%.
During the proceedings, however, NSP revised its estimated capital
structure to take additional actual data into account and reduced its
equity ratio to 41.46%.
The DPS again proposed use of a hypothetical common equity ratio of
40% and assigned all equity above the 40% level to debt at a cost rate of
12.62%, based on the average Standard & Poors "AA" monthly composite bond yield for the third quarter of 1980. The DPS, relying upon the
commission's 1979 NSP decision that imposed a hypothetical 40% equity
ratio, claimed that NSP's pretax coverage ratio and equity ratio ex120. Id. at 8-9.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id., quoting North Central Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-10l/GR-77-221 (Minn.
P.S.C. Dec. 30, 1977), at 15-16; see supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
125. North Central Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR-80-472 (Minn. P.U.C. June
19, 1981), at 8-9.
126. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. G-002/GR-80-556 (Minn. P.U.C. July
24, 1981).
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ceeded those of comparable utilities. Furthermore, the DPS maintained
that the hypothetical capital structure posed no threat to NSP's bond
rating.
The commission rejected the DPS recommendations. 127 The commission noted that it previously ratified NSP's estimated capital structure in
the recent electric rate proceeding.1 28 That proceeding established good
faith efforts by the company to move towards a more reasonable capital
structure and acknowledged possible changes in circumstances since imposition of the 40% limit on equity. The commission stated that nothing
in the present record altered its approval in the NSP electric case of an
equity ratio exceeding 40%. Additionally, the 41.46% equity ratio NSP
presently advocated fell below the equity ratio accepted in the electric
case as reasonable, thereby reducing the desirability of imposing a hypo129
thetical capital structure in the instant case.
The final major gas and electric decision issued by the commission in
1981 again involved Minnegasco.' 30 In this proceeding, Minnegasco proposed using a test year average capital structure containing 37.88% longterm debt, 9.25% preferred stock, and 52.87% common equity. The DPS
witness offered no objection to Minnegasco's proposed capital structure,
focusing attention solely on the cost of common equity. Since the company's capital structure recommendations went uncontested, both the examiner and the commission found it appropriate to use the unchallenged
test year capital structure containing 52.8% common equity for purposes
of establishing Minnegasco's cost of capital.13 , As in Minnegasco's first
rate proceeding in 1977, however, the commission relied upon the company's high equity ratio as one justification for allowing a return on eq32
uity lower than that allowed North Central only two months earlier.1
Another gas and electric utility decision examining capital structure
issues involved Peoples Natural Gas Company (Peoples).1 33 The issues
in this proceeding paralleled those of the North Central cases because
Peoples, like North Central, is merely an operating division of a corpora34
tion, InterNorth, Inc.1
127. Id. at 13.
128. Id., cilt/g Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-80-316 (Minn.
P.U.C. Apr. 30, 1981), at 26; see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.

129. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. G-002/GR-80-556 (Minn. P.U.C. July
30, 1981), at 13.

130. Minnesota Gas Co., Docket No. G-008/GR-80-630 (Minn. P.U.C. Aug. 27, 1981).
131. Id. at 22.
132. Id. at 32. An exhibit in the proceeding also showed, according to the commission's order, that Minnegasco's achieved rate of return on book equity exceeded the return

authorized in every year since 1975. Id.
133. Peoples Natural Gas Co., Docket No. G-01 1/GR-80-850 (Minn. P.U.C. Nov. 25,
1981).
134. InterNorth, Inc., is an investor owned gas utility, selling natural gas in southeastern and east central Minnesota, a portion of northwestern Minnesota, and to several large
customers located on the Iron Range.
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Peoples proposed use of the test year average capital structure of InterNorth, Inc., containing 53.247% common equity at a cost of 16%. The
DPS recommended use of a hypothetical capital structure containing
45% equity at a cost of 13.550%.
The witness for Peoples testified that the company's proposed capital
structure was beneficial and economical to the ratepayers. It preserved
existing bond ratings, thereby reducing the cost of borrowing, and
avoided the limitations upon the availability of capital that accompany
bond downgradings. The structure also preserved financial flexibility
and allowed Peoples to avoid financing during periods of high interest
rates. The witness testified that common equity ratios for natural gas
distribution companies rose from 42.0% in 1971 to 47.7% in 1979, while
the combined preferred and common equity ratios increased from 47.7 to
53.4% over the same period. This trend, according to the Peoples witness, reflected the increasing risks of the gas distribution business during
periods of high interest rates and inflation.
The DPS witness testified that InterNorth's capital structure should be
modified to recognize the major differences between comparable companies and InterNorth and recommended a hypothetical capital structure
for this purpose. The hypothetical capital structure adjusted InterNorth's equity ratio downward from 53.2 to 45% and allocated the
difference to other components of the capital structure at embedded cost
rates.
On rebuttal, Peoples challenged the DPS testimony by showing that
the group of comparable companies used by the DPS witness had an
average equity ratio of 49.9% and a combined preferred and equity ratio
of about 58%. Peoples argued that current, not embedded, costs should
be assigned to any equity allocated to other components of the capital
structure.
The examiner adopted the DPS proposal and recommended use of a
45% hypothetical equity ratio. The commission rejected the examiner's
35
recommendation and adopted People's proposed capital structure.
The commission held that the DPS failed to show that InterNorth is
more risky than its Peoples division. On this point, the commission
stated:
What was established is that InterNorth had divisions which present
more risk than typical gas distributors. However, as a general rule,
diversification tends to reduce risk. The DPS evidence with respect to
beta and standard deviation of price change suggests InterNorth is
slightly more risky than typical gas distributors, but other factors evaluated-level of revenues, common equity ratio, pretax coverage ratio,
and dividend payout ratio-tend to show InterNorth presents less risk
to investors. Thus, it cannot be concluded, on the basis of evidence
135. Peoples Natural Gas Co., Docket No. G-01 1/GR-80-850 (Minn. P.U.C. Nov. 25,
1981), at 14.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss2/7

30

Brehl and Gallagher: Review of Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Decisions Regardi
CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS

19821
presented,

that

InterNorth

is

more

risky than

a

typical

gas

distributor. 136
Furthermore, the commission held that even if InterNorth presented
greater risks than Peoples, the DPS must show that "this excess risk had
37
Acmanifested itself in a common equity ratio which was too high."1
cording to the commission, the DPS failed to show this.
In North CentralPubh'c Servi'ce Co. ,138 the commission again held that the
Donovan Companies, Inc., unconsolidated capital structure was the appropriate capital structure to be applied for ratemaking purposes. The
commission rejected the DPS proposed hypothetical capital structure
and followed its earlier North Central decisions, noting that the use of the
DPS hypothetical capital structure would tend to push North Central's
"earned return on equity below its allowed return on equity." The commission stated that it would be inappropriate to lower North Central's
return on equity "in the absence of convincing evidence that the Com39
The DPS failed to
pany's proposed capital structure is unreasonable."1
was unreasonable
structure
capital
proposed
show that North Central's
or the result of imprudent management.
The commission recognized that this decision was consistent with its
decision in Central Telephone Co. 140 In both cases the commission adopted
the actual capital structure of the parent company and rejected a hypo14 1
thetical capital structure.
On the other hand, in Peoples Natural Gas Co. ,142 the commission departed from its priorPeoples decision 143 and applied a hypothetical capital structure. The commission rejected the use of the average capital
structure of People's parent, InterNorth, proposed by Peoples. The commission noted that, while in the earlier Peoples case InterNorth had not
been shown to be riskier than a typical gas distribution company, the
record in the 1982 case showed that InterNorth had a higher risk, and a
correspondingly higher equity ratio, than a typical gas distribution

company. 144
IV.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

As noted at the outset, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized a
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Docket No. G-010/GR-81-780 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 30, 1982).
139. Id.at 17.
140. Docket No. P-405/GR-81-231 (Minn. P.U.C. May 13, 1982).
141. North Central Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR-81-780 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec.
30, 1982), at 17.
142. Docket No. G-01 1/GR-82-65 (Minn. P.U.C. Jan. 28, 1983).
143. Peoples Natural Gas Co., Docket No. G-01 1/GR-80-850 (Minn. P.U.C. Nov. 25,
1981).
144. Peoples Natural Gas Co., Docket No. G-01 1/GR-82-65 (Minn P.U.C. Jan. 28,
1983), at 14-15.
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number of years ago that the capital structure maintained by a utility
must remain within the discretion of management.1 45 The pressures capital ratios exert on a utility's ability to maintain credit and attract capital
on favorable terms necessitate management discretion. As pointed out
by the Florida Public Service Commission:
Management lives from day today with intricate and complex
problems of corporate finance, and has the responsibility of seeing that
the utility has the financial ability to meet its public duties. The invasion of the field of management in such a sensitive area is justified only
when the public interest requires the exercise of extreme measures for
146
its protection and benefit.
The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission also recognizes these principles. It generally refuses to impose a capital structure for ratemaking
purposes substantially different from the actual capital structure maintained by the utility. The significant exceptions involve instances in
which the commission adopted a double leverage capital structure that
prohibited the parent company from earning the authorized return, 147
and the two instances in which it imposed a purely hypothetical capital
structure. 148
The Minnesota commission's reluctance to impose hypothetical capital structures containing high debt ratios, as advocated by the DPS and
OCS, accords with the views of responsible outside financial experts who
testify that restraint in this regard is absolutely required in light of prevailing conditions in the capital markets. For example, Eugene E.
Meyer, a Vice President and Director of Kidder Peabody & Company,
Inc., provided incisive testimony supporting this position in the 1981 Bell
50
rate proceeding149 and in the most recent Peoples case.'1
Mr. Meyer testified that the marketplace, not the commission, establishes the true cost of capital for a utility. The utility competes for capi145. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 14-15, 216 N.W.2d 841, 850
(1974); see supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.

146. Florida Power & Light Co., 67 P.U.R.3d 113, 162 (Fla. P.S.C. 1966).
147. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-75-496 (Minn. P.S.C. Oct.
15, 1976); Continental Tel. Co. of Minnesota, Inc., Docket No. PR-121-1 (Minn. P.S.C.

Apr. 16, 1976).
148. See Peoples Natural Gas Co., Docket No. G-01 1/GR-82-65 (Minn. P.U.C. Jan.
28, 1983) (discussed supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text); Northern States Power

Co., Docket No. G-002/GR-78-0152 (Minn. P.S.C. Sept. 9, 1979) (discussed supra notes
104, 109-11 and accompanying text).
The capital structure determination, of course, is also affected by whether it is an
average test year capital structure, as in the NSP decisions, or end of test year capital

structure, as in the Otter Tail discussion, and whether particular items are included or
excluded, as in the MP&L decision.
149. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 29,
1981) (transcript Vol. IX, at 3-57).
150. Peoples Natural Gas Co., Docket No. G-01 1/GR-82-65 (Minn. P.U.C. Jan. 28,
1983).
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tal in the marketplace to finance ongoing construction programs or to
retire old debt issues. It is to these markets that utility management
must take the results of decisions in rate proceedings when new capital is
needed. The cost of capital, as established by the marketplace, depends
upon a host of political and economic factors, including the utility's ability to place senior securities at reasonable prices and to sell common
equity at or above book value.
Mr. Meyer testified that investors in senior securities are primarily
concerned with current yield, maintenance of the quality of the investment and, ultimately, principal repayment. Ratings by rating agencies
such as Moody's Investor Services, Inc., and Standard & Poor's Corporation are critical factors in determining the price of senior securities.151
Rating agencies rely heavily upon coverage ratios and capital structures,
in addition to other factors, in establishing rating requirements.15 2 Thus,
a conservative capital structure favorably affects the securities rating and
the cost of debt confronted by the utility.
Mr. Meyer testified that the quality of senior securities has seriously
deteriorated in recent years. While Moody's and Standard & Poor's
downgraded the senior securities of 232 utilities from 1970 to 1980, only
44 achieved higher ratings during the same period. 153 As quality (measured by coverage ratios, capital structure, and regulatory environment)
declines, the return provided by the security fails to compensate the investor for the increased risk. When the investor is not compensated for
risk, the market value of the security declines and the security becomes
marketable.
Mr. Meyer succinctly stated the case in the recent Bell proceeding:
Excessive debt is the primary culprit responsible for bond rating reductions and indenture violations. With rating reductions and indenture
violations comes the inability to finance, in some cases regardless of
price. In my judgment, utility companies must strive to reduce the
amount of leverage employed in their capital structures. Due primarily
to increased competition in the telecommunications markets, inflationary trends in our economy and upheaval in the world energy markets,
utility business risks have increased sharply. This higher risk must be
151. For example, during November 1980, the average yield for outstanding "Aaa"
bonds was 13.39%; for "Aa" bonds, 13.96%; for "A" bonds, 14.12%; and for "Baa" bonds,
14.79%. The monthly differentials between bond ratings from January 1975 through November 1980 were as follows:
Outstanding Issues Yield Differentials, By Basis Points
A- Baa
Aa-A
Aaa-Aa
Highest
Average
Highest
Average
Highest
Average
133
54
92
33
122
37
Id. (Transcript Vol. IX, at 23).
152. Id. (Exhibit EWM-12) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
153. Id. (Exhibit EWM-3) (see Appendix accompanying this article).
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offset by lower financial risk; i.e., lower debt ratios and higher equity
ratios. 154
Mr. Meyer's testimony also established that it is important to both
stockholders and ratepayers that a utility be able to market its common
stock at some margin above book value:
When new equity capital must be sold at market prices below book
value, dilution of earnings per share and assets per share occur. When
such a situation continues it becomes ever more difficult to issue new
shares except at even lower price levels, thus extending the downward
cycle. The sale of stock at prices below book value requires ever larger rate increases as an offset. As shown by Exhibit EWM-I ,I1551 the sale of common
stock below book value requires a higher rate of return on equity just to stay even,
let alone meet the requirements of the marketplace. This is obviously bad for
the common stockholder, and though not so obvious, it is also bad for
56
the ratepayer when the next rate case rolls around.1
It is also fundamental, according to Mr. Meyer's testimony, that the
return on equity is an important measure of a utility's ability to attract
new capital:
The dollars provided by the return on equity provide the coverage
on bonds, preferred stock and commercial paper, in addition to the
obvious earnings per share and dividends per share.
When the return on equity is too low, coverages are inadequate, security ratings are downgraded and the price of the common stock declines below book value. So long as deterioration in the rate of return
on equity occurs, earnings per share will decline, finally to the level of
the common dividend where the decline must be arrested or the dividend cannot be paid in full. If a utility company begins to reduce its
dividend, it is effectively foreclosed from the marketplace for new capi157
tal funds.
Given these basic principles, as enunciated by Mr. Meyer, it is apparent that the commission should view recommendations that it adopt a
hypothetical capital structure for ratemaking purposes, or adopt substantial adjustments to an actual capital structure, with extreme skepticism.
Such recommendations, no matter how couched or supported, if
adopted, reduce the utility's return on invested capital to something less
than the market prescribed cost of capital. The long term result of the
short term reduction in rates obtained in this manner ultimately will be
to reduce the utility's financial flexibility and to increase the utility's cost
of debt and cost of equity to the detriment of both the shareholders and
the ratepayers. The commission should be commended for its past reluc154. Id. (Transcript Vol. IX, at 40).
155. Id. (Exhibit EWM- 11) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
156. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR-80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 29,
1981) (Transcript Vol. IX, at 36).
157. Id. at 37-38.
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tance to embark on such a hazardous course of action and should be
encouraged to continue carefully scrutinizing all of the ramifications of
such recommendations in the future.
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APPENDIX

Utility Companies Downgraded by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard &
Poor's Corporation

*DATE

COMPANY

SENIOR RATING REDUCED
FROM TO
BY

1970
1/14
2/18
2/25
2/25

Connecticut Light & Power
Potomac Electric Power
Duke Power
Duke Power

AAA
Aa
AAA
Aaa

Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

4/ 7
4/23
5/13
6/ 4

Trunkline Gas
Boston Gas
Monongahela Power
Kansas City Power & Light

A
A
AA
AAA

Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

&
&
&
&

Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
Poor's

6/15
6/22
7/ 2§
8/27

Appalachian Power
Boston Edison
Jamaica Water Supply
Southern Connecticut Gas

AA
AAA
A
A

Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

&
&
&
&

Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
Poor's

8/27
9/15
9/29
9/29

Southern Connecticut Gas
Ohio Edison
Carolina Tel. & Tel.
Carolina Tel. & Tel.

A
AAA
Aa
AA

Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

9/29
9/29
12/ 1
12/ 2

Elizabethtown Gas
Elizabethtown Gas
Ohio Power
New England Power

AA
Aa
Aa
AA

Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

12/ 7
12/ 8
12/10

New Bedford Gas & Electric
Iowa Electric & Power
Philadelphia Electric

AA
AA
Aaa

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

1/13
2/ 1
2/18
4/ 1

Florida Power & Light
Pennsylvania Power & Light
Jersey Central Power & Light
Ohio Power

AA
AA
A
AA

Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

5/ 4
5/11
6/ 3
8/10

Wisconsin Public Service
Southern New England Telephone
Kansas City Power & Light
Consumers Power

AA
AAA
Aaa
AAA

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

8/19
8/26
8/26
10/19

Pennsylvania Electric
Hawaiian Telephone
Hawaiian Telephone
Carolina Power & Light

A
Aa
AA
Aa

Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

10/19
11/ 3
11/29

Carolina Power & Light
Metropolitan Edison
Iowa Power & Light

AA
A
AA

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's

1971
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Utility Companies Downgraded by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard &
Poor's Corporation
*DA1rE

COMPANY

SENIOR RATING REDUCED
TO
BY
FROM

19771
(Con t'd)
11/29

Orange & Rockland Utilities
Orange & Rockland Utilities
Rockland Electric Company
Rockland Electric Company
Rockland Light & Power
Rockland Light & Power

A
A
A
A
A
A

Baa
BBB
Baa
BBB
Baa
BBB

Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

Kentucky Power
Niagara Mohawk
Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Central Vermont Public Service

BBB
A
A
BBB

Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

&
&
&
&

Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
Poor's

A
A
AA
A

Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

&
&
&
&

Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
Poor's

197 2

2/24
3/11 #
3/22
#

Columbus & So. Ohio Electric
Rochester Gas & Electric
New England Tel. & Tel.
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric

A
AA
AA
A
AA
AA
AAA
AA

#
5/17
6/ 6
6/12
6/29
8/14 "
8/16
12/ 5
12/12
12/12
12/16 #

New Jersey Power & Light
Pennsylvania Power
Consumers Power
Cambridge Electric Light
Baltimore Gas & Electric
New Jersey Power & Light
Jersey Central Power & Light
Duke Power
Georgia Power
Georgia Power
Canal Electric

A
AA
Aaa
AA
AAA
A
A
AA
Aa
AA
AA

BBB
A
Aa
A
AA
Baa
Baa
A
A
A
A

Standard
Standard
Moody's
Standard
Standard
Moody's
Moody's
Standard
Moody's
Standard
Standard

& Poor's
& Poor's

Commonwealth Edison
Consolidated Edison of New York
Indiana & Michigan Electric
Boston Edison Company
Pacific Tel. & Tel. (all Debs. &
Notes)
Atlantic City Electric
Natural Gas Pipeline
Duke Power
Boston Edison Company

AAA
A
AA
AA
AAA

AA
BBB
A
A
AA

Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

&
&
&
&

AA
Aa
Aa
Aa

A
A
A
A

Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's

San Diego Gas & Electric
Union Electric
Public Service New Hampshire
Public Service New Hampshire

AA
AA
A
A

A
A
Baa
BBB

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

1/17
2/ 3
2/ 9
#

& Poor's
& Poor's

& Poor's
& Poor's
& Poor's

1973
2/ 5
2/14
3/24#
4/14#
5/31
6/13
9/19
11/12
12/10#

Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
Poor's

Standard & Poor's

Moody's

1974
1/
2/
3/
3/

7
5
6
6
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Utility Companies Downgraded by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard &
Poor's Corporation

*DATE

COMPANY

SENIOR RATING REDUCED
BY
TO

FROM

1974
(Cont'd)
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

3/ 7
3/17 #
3/21
4/ 1
4/ 2
4/ 9
4/18
4/18

Consolidated Edison of New York
Jamaica Water
Connecticut Light & Power
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.

Baa
A
Withdrawn
A
AA
Aa
Aaa

Wisconsin Power & Light Co.
Hartford Electric Light Co.
Western Massachusetts Electric
Western Massachusetts Electric

AA
AA
Aa
AA

4/27 #
5/14
5/14
5/ 1

Consolidated Edison of New York
The Detroit Edison Company
The Detroit Edison Company
Cleveland Electric Illuminating

5/ 6#
5/ 6#
5/ 7
5/13 #

Central Vermont Public Service
Iowa Electric Light & Power
Columbus & So. Ohio Electric
Consolidated Edison of New York

BB
BBB
A
Aa
A
AA
AA
AAA
Withdrawn
A
Aa
A
Aa
Withdrawn

5/13 #
5/20#
5/20#
5/20#

Savannah Electric & Power Co.
Blackstone Valley Electric
Brockton Edison Company
Eastern Utilities Associates

A
A
A
Baa

Baa
Baa
Baa
Ba

5/20#
5/28
6/ 4
6/ 8#

Fall River Electric Light
Ohio Power Company
Central Illinois Light Company
Savannah Electric & Power Co.

A
A
AA
A

Baa
Baa
A
BBB

Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's

6/13
6/13
6/17
6/24

Delmarva Power & Light
Delmarva Power & Light
Long Island Lighting
Virginia Electric Power

Aa
AA
AA
Aa

A
A
A
A

Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

6/24
6/26
6/26
7/15 #

Virginia Electric Power
Boston Edison Company
Boston Edison Company
Connecticut Light & Power

AA
A
A
Aa

A
BBB
Baa
A

7/15#
7/17
7/17
7/23

Hartford Electric Light Co.
Consumers Power Company
Consumers Power Company
Toledo Edison

Aa
Aa
AA
AA

A
A
A
A

Standard
Standard
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard
Standard

8/ 5#
8/12
8/20
9/21

Pennylvania Power Company
Florida Power Corporation
Ohio Edison Company
Florida Power Corporation

Aa
Aa
Aaa
AA

A
A
Aa
A

Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

The Detroit Edison Company
The Detroit Edison Company
New York State Electric & Gas

A
A
AA

Baa
BBB
A

Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's

10/ 1
10/ 1
10/ 3
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A
A
A
A

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's

& Poor's
& Poor's

& Poor's
& Poor's
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Utility Companies Downgraded by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard &
Poor's Corporation
*DATE

COMPANY

SENIOR RATING REDUCED
FROM
TO
BY

1974
(Cont'd)
Southern California Gas
Niagara Mohawk
Philadelphia Electric
Philadelphia Electric
Dayton Power & Light
Dayton Power & Light
Ohio Power Company
Cincinnati Gas & Electric
Cincinnati Gas & Electric
San Diego Gas & Electric
Florida Power & Light
Nevada Power
Consumers Power
Georgia Power

AA

1/ 9
1/ 9
1/22
1/23

Western Massachusetts Electric
Western Massachusetts Electric
Columbus & Southern Ohio
Hartford Electric Light

A
A
A
A

Baa
BBB
BBB
BBB

Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's

1/25#
1/25#
1/27#
1/27#

Georgia Power Company
Savannah Electric & Power Co.
Georgia Power Company
Savannah Electric & Power Co.

A
BBB
BBB
BB
Withdrawn
Withdrawn

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's

2/10#
2/19
2/24
2/24
2/24 #
2/25
3/ 3#
3/13**
3/19C
4/ 8
4/22
4/24
5/ 1
5/ 6
6/24
6/28#
7/12 #
9/ 6#
9/ 6#
9/ 6#

Appalachian Power
Arizona Public Service
Houston Lighting & Power
Houston Lighting & Power

Baa
Baa
Aa
AA
Baa
AA
Baa
Baa
A
Aa
BBB
BBB

Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

Union Electric Company
Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Appalachian Power Company
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.

A
A
Aaa
AAA
A
AAA
A
A
Aa
Aaa
A
A

Pacific Power & Light Company
San Diego Gas & Electric
United Illuminating
Central Maine Power Co.
Ohio Edison Company
Eastern Utilities Associates
Blackston Valley Electric Co.
Fall River Electric Light Co.

A
A
AA
A
AA
BBB
A
A

Baa
Baa
A
BBB
A
BB
BBB
BBB

Moody's
Moody's
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

10/ 8
10/ 8
10/17
10/17
10/22
10/22
10/29
11/19
11/19
11/19§§
11/19
12/ 5
12/23 #
12/23#

& Poor's
& Poor's

AA
A
AAA
Aaa

Standard
Standard
Moody's
Standard
Moody's
Standard
Standard
Standard
Moody's

Aa
Aa
A
A

Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

A

Moody's

A
Aa
AA
Aa

& Poor's
& Poor's
& Poor's
& Poor's

1975

Indiana & Michigan Electric
Louisville Gas & Electric
Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.
Carolina Power & Light Co.
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Utility Companies Downgraded by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard &
Poor's Corporation
SENIOR RATING REDUCED
*DATE

COMPANY

FROM

TO

BY

Nevada Power Company
Toledo Edison Company
Central Hudson Gas & Electric
El Paso Electric Company
San Diego Gas & Electric Co.

Baa
A
A
A
BBB

Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

Hackensack Water
Hackensack Water
Central Illinois Light Company
New York State Electric & Gas
Pacific Power & Light Company
Toledo Edison Company
Alabama Power Company
Ohio Edison Company
Alabama Power Company
Arkansas Power & Light Company
Gulf Power Company
Louisiana Power & Light Co.
Jamaica Water Supply

A
A
A
A
BBB
Baa
Baa
A
BBB
Baa
A
Baa
Ba

Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's

The Montana Power Company
The Montana Power Company
Southern California Gas
Kansas City Power & Light

A
A
A
A

Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

Pacific Tel. & Tel. Company
Louisiana Power & Light
Kansas Gas & Electric
Idaho Power Company
Pennsylvania Power Company
Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Kansas Gas & Electric
Potomac Edison
Brockton Edison
Gulf States Utilities
United Illuminating

Aa
BBB
A
A
Baa
A
A
Baa
BBB
A
BBB

Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's

Commonwealth Edison
Monongahela Power
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Company
Duquesne Light

Aa
Baa
A
A

Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's

1975
(Cont'd)
9/29#
10/ 8
11/ 5
11/18
11/29#
1976
1/21
1/21
5/ 5
5/10
6/12#
6/24
7/ 5
7/20
8/ 7#
8/23 #
9/28 #
12/14
12/ 6#
1977
1/24#
3/ 5#
10/11
11/16
1978
1/11
1/18
3/21
4/ 3#
4/19
6/27
7/29#
8/ 7#
9/23#
11/30#
12/ 2#

Moody's
Standard
Standard
Moody's
Standard
Standard
Standard

& Poor's
& Poor's
& Poor's
& Poor's
& Poor's

1979
1/15#
2/ 5#
2/ 7
2/20
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Utility Companies Downgraded by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard &
Poor's Corporation
*DATE

COMPANY

SENIOR RATING REDUCED
FROM TO
BY

1979
(Cont'd)
4/ 4
4/23#
4/23#
4/28#
4/24
6/21**
7/ 2#
7/17S
11/ 7**

Gulf States Utilities
Pennsylvania Electric
Metropolitan Edison
Metropolitan Edison
Gulf Power Company
Arkansas Power & Light
Metropolitan Edison
Long Island Lighting

Aa
A
A
Baa
Withdrawn
A
BBB
AA
A
Reinstated
Aa

Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

A
BBB
Baa
A

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's

Commonwealth Edison

Aa

A

Moody's

2/ 2#
2/ 2#
2/26
2/26

Metropolitan Edison
Jersey Central Power & Light
Public Service Co. of Colorado
Public Service Co. of Colorado

BBB
A
Aa
AA

BB
BBB
A
A

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

3/ 8#
3/19**
3/26
3/26

Mississippi Power & Light
New Orleans Public Service Inc.
Kansas Gas & Electric
Kansas Gas & Electric

A
A
A
A

BBB
BBB
Baa
BBB

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

3/31 #
3/31 #
3/31 #
4/ 5#

Baa
Baa
Baa
A

Ba
B
Ba
BBB

Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

4/12 #
4/19#
4/28#
6/21 #

Jersey Central Power & Light
Metropolitan Edison
Pennsylvania Electric
Ohio Edison
Philadelphia Electric
Consumers Power
United Illuminating
Commonwealth Edison

A
A
A
AA

BBB
BBB
Baa
A

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's

6/23#
7/ 7#
7/12# S
8/26#

Long Island Lighting
Kansas City Power & Light
Long Island Lighting
Missouri Power & Light

A
Aa
A
A

Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's

8/30#
9/13 #
9/13#
9/16

A
A
AA
A

9/20
9/23
10/ 8
11/25

Dayton Power & Light
Hartford Electric Light
Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Connecticut Light & Power
Pennsylvania Power
Duquesne Light
Toledo Edison
Central Hudson Gas & Electric

Baa
A
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
A
BBB

A
AA
A
A

BBB
A
BBB
Baa

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

12/
12/
12/
12/

New York State Electric & Gas
Houston Lighting & Power
New York State Electric & Gas
Consumers Power

A
Aa
A
A

Baa
A
BBB
Baa

Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

1980

2
3
6#
8#
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&
&
&
&

Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
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Represents date of new issue.
Preferred offering.
# New debt offering not involved. Date, where shown, is Agency's publication date.
I Private Placement.
§ Sale was postponed.
C Correction.
S Same rating as Company's General and Refunding Bonds.
Note: Assumed debt of predecessor not listed.
Source: Moody's Bond Survey
Standard & Poor's Bond Outlook and Fixed Income Investor
*

**
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Electric Utility Companies Upgraded by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard
& Poor's Corporation
RATING UPGRADED
DATE

COMPANY

FROM

TO

BY

1970
March
April
July

Kentucky Utilities
Washington Water Power
Gulf Power Company
Gulf Power Company

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's

Texas Electric Service
Montana-Dakota Utilities
Nevada Power
Southern Nevada Power
1971
May

Southwestern Public Service

A

Aa

Moody's

1973
February
April
May

Otter Tail Power
Iowa Southern Utilities
Pacific Power & Light
Pacific Power & Light

Moody's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

1974
Public Service New Mexico

A

Metropolitan Edison
Consolidated Edison of New York
Conslidated Edison of New York
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric
Wisconsin Public Service

BBB
BB
Ba
A
A

Standard & Poor's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Standard & Poor's
Moody's

Wisconsin Public Services
Wisconsin Power & Light
Utah Power & Light
Kentucky Power

A
A
A
BBB

Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard

Iowa Public Service
Consolidated Edison of New York
Jersey Central Power & Light
Sierra Pacific Power
Niagara Mohawk Power
Arizona Public Service
Carolina Power & Light
Iowa Electric Light & Power
Savannah Electric & Power Co.

A
BBB+
BBB
BBB
BBB
Baa
Baa
Baa
Ba

Moody's
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's

Aa

Moody's

1975
March
June

October
1976
May
September
October

&
&
&
&

Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
Poor's

&
&
&
&

Poor's
Poor's
Poor's
Poor's

1977
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
November
December
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1978
April
June
September

Hartford Electric Light
Orange & Rockland Utilities
Rockland Electric
Consumers Power

BBB
BBB
BBB
Baa

Savannah Electric & Power

BB

Standard
Standard
Standard
Moody's
Standard

Madison Gas & Electric
Consolidated Edison of New York
Sierra Pacific Power
Orange and Rockland Utilities
Rockland Electric
Rockland Light & Power

A
Baa
Baa
Baa
Baa
Baa

Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's
Moody's

& Poor's
& Poor's
& Poor's
& Poor's

1979
May
August

1980
September Potomac Electric Power
A
Aa
Moody's
Source: Moody's Bond Survey
Standard & Poor's Bond Outlook and Fixed Income Investor
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